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ResDonse to Comments 
DANIEL E. BASSUK 
I should like to thank my critics for giving me a thorough 
reading. I in turn have a profound respect for John Yungblut 
and greatly treasure the year we spent together. 
The difficulty I have with Yungblut's critique is his refusal 
to acknowledge the distinctions that I and others have tried 
to point out. The counsel given by Rufus Jones to Yungblut, 
"If you seek reality in religion, read the mystics," is clever 
advice. However, what did Jones mean by the word "reality"? 
Did he mean by "reality" a direct and firsthand spiritual 
experience, or the Reality of the universe? This distinction is 
essential and corresponds to my distinction between "mystical" 
and "mysticism," which Jones adhered to in 1917. Slurring 
over this difference led Jones to be divided in his feelings 
toward Plotinus and Eckhart, as my essay points out; Yung- 
blut's response is to sing of paradoxology. And "read the 
mystics" is good advice until one finds them disagreeing among 
themselves (e.g., Fox and Norris, Jones and Eckhart). Then 
what happens to the search for "reality in religion"? 
As for the minor points, first allow me to point out that 
the word "egregious," which my critic stumbled over, was in a 
quotation of our editor. I chose to use it to illustrate that I 
am not alone in observing the ambiguity into which Rufus 
Jones has led us. 
Second, Yungblut places Jones in the good company of 
Underhill, Herman, Inge, von Hugel, James, Otto, and Stace, 
on mystical experience. But upon closer inspection he should 
see that Otto and Stace moved out from Jones and James and 
with delight dealt with the metaphysical realm of mysticism as 
experienced by Eckhart, Shankara, and Plotinus, while Jones 
cringed over it. 
Ultimate Reality? For Rufus Jones, mysticism in this sense is 
to be rejected. He finds it completely out of touch with real- 
ity and with his age, and does all that he can to uproot and 
destroy it. Jones exhibits a preference for an experiential 
mystical event which is concrete and vital and leads to positive 
action. A philosophical approach such as that of Heiler, 
which Ieads to a Platonic ideal or a Plotinian oneness, is too 
abstract and non-pragmatic for Jones. Jones conceives of the 
Inner Light as somethng which can be experienced in the hush 
and silence of the Quaker meeting for worship. It leads one 
to an active concern for one's fellow beings. Jones actually 
knew the reality of this experience in his own life. 
11. JONES AND T H E  QUAKERS 
A. JONES AND GEORGE FOX 
In this section I will investigate how Rufus Jones anived 
at the belief that Quakerism was mystical. In his "Intro- 
duction" to the historical study, The Beginning3 of Quakerism, 
Jones states that "Quakerism, as a type of Christianity, is 
deeply mystical and also deeply pr~phetical."'~ He says this 
in connection with his discussion of the founder of Quakerism, 
George Fox. There is no doubt that his concept of a mystical 
Quakerism stems from his view of Fox. 
Rufus Jones wrote three books on George Fox and pub- 
lished an abridged version of Fox's Journal in 1903, titled 
George Fox, An Autobiography. He wrote many chapters in 
his books and in articles for journals, and delivered numerous 
addresses, on Fox. Jones believes that Fox took his place in 
religious history among the spiritual reformers of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, among men like Denck, Franck, 
Schwenckfeld, Castellio, and Boehme, and that these reformers 
"were in sympathy with the mystic's type of religi~n."'~ By 
"sympathy" Jones means that they held to the mystical doc- 
trine that the divine Seed or Inward Light was the essential 
nexus between God and man. From 1903 until just shortly 
before his death in 1948, a period of forty-five years, Rufus 
Jones was espousing the belief that Fox had said that "there 
is something of God, which may be called a divine seed or a 
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severe reduction of self-importance," since "egoism is an 
undoubted hindrance." But for Jones, the effort at complete 
self-naughting means "that you cease to be a person at all," 
and this he takes to be against the divine purpose.lg 
Jones took issue not only with Huxley but with the 
German scholar Friedrich Heiler. In 1936 Rufus Jones dis- 
agreed with Heiler's concept of mysticism, saying. 
Friedrich Heiler, . . . in his definition of mysticism, 
has pushed the negative aspect of it to its farthest 
limits. He defines mysticism as "that form of com- 
munion with God in which the world and the self 
are radically negated, in which the human person- 
ality is dissolved, submerged and engulfed in the 
infinite one-ness of Divinity." 
Here, I am convinced, a metaphysical theory is 
voicing itself, not an experience. Mysticism has 
taken this form because it is dominated by a 
metaphysical theory. My contention always has 
been, and still is, that this particular way of 
approach was determined by a prevailing type of 
philosophical outlook, and is in no real sense 
essential to genuine mystical experience." 
It can be observed that Rufus Jones dispenses with Heiler, as 
with Huxley, in terms of his own preference for mystical expe- 
rience rather than for the metaphysical doctrine of mysticism. 
It  is ironic that both Heiler and Jones cite Archbishop 
Nathan Soderblom as their source for the idea of dividing up 
mysticism into two distinguishable types. From Soderblom's 
division of mysticism into the mysticism of infinity and the 
mysticism of personality, Heiler derives his distinction between 
mysticism and the prophetic, while Jones comes away with the 
concepts of negation mysticism and affirmation mysticism." 
Sijderblom's mysticism of personality is the source of both 
Heiler's "prophetic consciousness" and Jones's ''affirmation mys- 
ticism," and the two are similar in being biblical, ethical, 
personalistic, action and service oriented, and concerned with 
historical time. 
What has become of "mysticism" as understood in the 
sense of the German Mystik, the metaphysical doctrine of the 
relationship and potential union of the human soul with 
Finally, I heartily agree with Yungblut that the synchro. 
nicity of mystical experience does have relevance. But so does 
mysticism, which Jones so disliked and tried so hard to extirpate. 
In response to J.  Floyd Moore, I can only say that I have 
indeed read all the literature he has cited, and more (pardon 
the pun), and that at the editor's discretion my analysis of Also- 
brook, Moore, and Dwyer was deleted for lack of space. Since 
he asks me what I think of Alsobrook's analysis, let me say 
that Alsobrook's dissertation is primarily an analysis and that 
the critical evaluation he offered was based mainly on the 
works of Barth, Brunner, Berdyaev, and Kierkegaard. The 
fault with this dissertation lies in the contrast between the 
Quaker views of Jones and the views of the aforementioned 
neeorthodox theologians, who are in a tradition totally at 
odds with Jones's liberal theology. The critical evaluation 
would have been more pertinent had it been based upon 
sources from within Jones's own Quaker tradition, rather than 
from a totally foreign one. 
I find it revealing to see Moore referring to Quakerism as 
a "liberating spiritual movement which can find a meeting 
place of the divine with all humanity." His view, that Quaker- 
ism "has much to l e an  from Buddha, Laetzu, Shankara, the 
Sufis, Gandhi, and the empiricism of native African religion," 
shows me that Moore is expressing an attitude which combines 
two main lines of interpreting Quakerism today: as mystical 
Quakerism and as liberal Quakerism. For the exponent of 
the liberal interpretation of Quakerism, 
Quakerism means freedom to roam all over the 
religious map, and he values his liberty to do 
this and enjoys observing his fellow Quakers roam- 
ing freely about, even though they may be moving 
in directions very different from the direction in 
which he is moving himself. For many such the 
Society is primarily a refuge for those who want 
freedom to follow their own individual bent in 
an atmosphere that is mildly religious and fiercely 
tolerant. They see the Society of Friends as one of 
the liberal denominations and feel a certain kin- 
ship with other liberal den0minations.l 
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Moore also presents us with the mystical interpretation of 
Quakerism. According to this view, 
Quakerism is one of many outcroppings of mysti- 
cal religion that have occurred from time to time 
in Christian history. In support of this view an 
attempt has been made to trace the spiritual ances- 
try of the Quakers through a long chain of Chris- 
tian mystics. The Quakers are represented as one 
of the links in this chain. . . . Quakers of the mys- 
tical type.. . begin to think of their faith as the 
Christian version of mystical religion and to claim 
a spiritual kinship with mystics belongjng to non- 
Christian traditions. In fact, some Friends main- 
tain that the special historical task of the Quakers 
is to be that Christian denomination that embodies 
the spirit of Christian mysticism and thereby serves 
as a bridqe between Christianity and the mystical 
element in other religions. . . . There is a univer- 
salism that belongs to mystical Quakerism but it 
is not the universalism of the Christian faith. It 
is the universalism of mysticism. For the mystic, 
Christianity is one particular manifestation in his- 
tory of an "eternal gospel" whose truth is not 
dependent on any historical events? 
I fully agree with Moore that Rufus Jones did point us 
in these directions. But what is left unanswered is why Jones 
had so much trouble with the type of mysticism exemplified in 
Buddha, Lao-tzu, and Shankara. I should like to ask Moore 
if he is ready to accept these so-called life-negating mystics, who 
describe the Godhead as Neti, Neti, into his ethical, rational, 
social Quakerism? 
It  is beyond my ken to deal with "the future of the Society 
of Friends in the world community." My perspective is ., 
religious studies, with special attention to mysticism and the 
mystical. I am concerned with the analysis of Jones and with 
looking carefully at the way in which he changed Quakerism 
from within. Even if Rufus Jones was pointing us in the P 
direction of the future world commuunity, should that prevent 
us from subjecting him to a scholarly analysis? We should 
have nothing to fear, for Quakerism will undoubtedly survive 
in the world community regardless of our theological debate. 
him: "Mysticism is an immediate, intuitive, experimental 
knowledge of God, or one may say it is consciousness of a 
Beyond, or of transcendent Reality, or of Divine Presence.'"' 
What Jones is saying in all of his definitions of mysticism, 
including this one, is that mysticism is for him a psychological 
matter made up of experiential and non-rational experiences. 
Nowhere but in the ERE does he hold to the distinction made 
there that mysticisnl is a metaphysical doctrine and is distinct 
from the mystical, which is psychological. 
It is quite evident that, although R u h s  Jones made the 
distinction between mysticism and mystical experience in the 
ERE, he decided not to follow it. This is indicated by those 
two books in which "mysticism" appears in the title and by the 
feelings expressed in his remark that "I am not interested in 
mysticism as an ism. It turns out in most accounts to be a 
dry and abstract thing.. . . It  is mystical experience and not 
mysticism that is worthy of our study."ll 
The individual mystics and groups of mystics for whom 
Jones shows most appreciation in his historical studies - 
George Fox, St. Paul, the Spiritual Reformers, the Seekers, 
the Friends of God, and "some exponents of mystical religion" 
- are all interpreted to be mystical rather than involved with 
the metaphysical doctrine of mysticism. When he is con- 
fronted with mysticism understood in its metaphysical sense, 
he disagrees and is ready to dispute it. For example, when 
Jones read Aldous Huxley's Grey Eminence (1941) he dis- 
agreed with Huxley's understanding of mysticism: "Aldous 
Huxley in that remarkable book, Grey Eminence, raises the 
question, 'Why shouldn't Mysticism die out?' as he thinks (I 
believe wrongly) that it seemed likely to do at the end of the 
seventeenth century."lz The reason for the disagreement about 
mysticism is that Jones is thinking of it in a psychological 
sense, while Huxley was thinking of it in a metaphysical sense. 
And in 1945, when Huxley published The Perennial Philos- 
ophy, an anthology of mysticism which emphasized negating 
the self, Jones explicitly took issue with Huxley. In The 
Luminous Trail (1947) Jones objects that the perennial phil- 
osophy was presented solely as a via negativa. He concedes 
"that there is an element of truth in this insistence on the 
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In this article Rufus Jones clearly makes the distinction between 
mysticism and the mystical. However, in 1936 Jones was to 
modify his earlier understanding of Mystik, writing that "the 
German language has two words where we have but one. I t  
uses 'Mysticismus' for the occult and the abnormal, and 'Mystik' 
for the theory of life that God and man are akin and in recip 
rocal relationship."' Elsewhere he understands the nature of 
mysticism to be grounded in "Greek rationalistic metaphysics" 
and tells us that "the Platonic stream of life and thought is 
beyond question the greatest single source of European mysti- 
~ i s m . " ~  He also realizes that "this intellectual formulation - 
and it is the metaphysics underlying historical mysticism - 
necessarily involves a via negativa.'."' 
Of Jones's fifty-four Books, only two have the w r d  "mys- 
ticism" in the title: The F1owerin.g of Mysticism: The  Friends 
of God in the Fourteenth Century j1939), and Mysticism and 
Democracy in the English Commonwealth (1932). Since he 
does not use the word mysticism in the precise way in which 
he defined it in the ERE anywhere else in his writings, let us 
look at these two books to see how Jones means it to be 
understood. 
In Mysticism and Democracy in the English Common- 
wealtlz Jones starts out by saying: 
I have always used the word mysticism with a 
much wider meaning, and shall continue to do so. 
The essential feature of a mystical experience as I 
view it is not the negative path of approach nor 
the special scale of ladder-steps upward, nor the 
empty-handed, or niwana, state in which the 
experience culminates. Its essential aspect is 
rather the conviction of certainty that the person's 
own soul has found its goal of reality in God? 
Jones makes it clear in this book that he is concerned with the 
affirmation mystics rather than the negative ones, and sees no 
reason for denying an extension of meaning to the word mys- 
ticism. This indicates an unwillingness on Jones's part to I) 
abide by his earlier definition in the ERE. 
In the book T h e  Flowering of Mysticism Jones gives one 
of his many famous definitions of what mysticism means for 
T o  my dear mentor, Lewis Benson, I can only say that 
once again I find his inner light radiant, clear, and glowing. 
The way he reads me is the way I would like everyone to 
understand what I am trying to convey. I agree with his point 
that metaphysical mysticism does not exclude experience and 
that Jones's own particular form of mystical experience, affirm- 
ative mysticism, does not exclude metaphysics. However, I 
feel that he and I would agree that it is too simple to just slur 
over the differences between mystical experience and meta- 
physical mysticism, as Jones would do. 
Both Lewis Benson and John Yungblut criticize me for 
not making a true analogy between Benson's categories of 
prophetic and philosophical Quakerism, and experiential and 
metaphysical mysticism. Allow me to clarify this. First of all, 
I was not trying to say that they are identical. I merely said 
that the two traditions are analogous to the categories of 
mystical and mysticism. I wholly agree that Jones's affirmation 
mysticism is vastly different from Benson's prophetic Quaker- 
ism, which is grounded in the biblical tradition. Affirmation 
mysticism is a mixed breed, combining the Hebraic with the 
Hellenistic. In this essay I have attempted to draw out the dis- 
tinction between the mystical and mysticism. In order not to 
overly complicate matters, I have ignored a third religious mode, 
the prophetic. As I see it, in Prophetic Quakerism Benson 
is dealing with the prophetic mode and contrasting it with the 
mode of metaphysical mysticism, which he calls "philosoph- 
ical." On the other hand, I am dealing with the experiential- 
mystical mode and the mode of metaphysical mysticism. 
The mode to which Jones's affirmation mysticism belongs is 
experiential-mystical - neither Benson's prophetic nor my 
metaphysical mysticism, but rather a hybrid which falls some- 
. where between the two. Jones's affirmation mysticism helped 
to create the contemporary trend of mystical Quakers who refer 
to the Inner Light and that of God in such a way as to fit 
them in with today's dabblings with consciousness-raising, 
nature and aesthetic "highs," spiritual experiences, peak- 
experiences, and psychedelic and visionary experiences. This 
is where Rufus Jones has led contemporary Quakerism. It is 
for me, as I believe it is for Lewis Benson, a mild and passive 
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form of religion which lacks the power, strength, and vigor 
felt by the early Quakers. I well understand his anguish and 
his call for the revitalization within Quakerism of the history- 
making quality that once existed. May we all be guided by 
the Light that enlightens the world. 
1. Lewis Benson, Catholic Quakerism: A Vision for All Men (Philadel- 
phia: Book 8c Publications Committee. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of 
the Religious Society of Friends, 1968). pp. 4-5. 
2 Ibid., pp. 1-4. 
of Benson specifically pointed to Rufus Jones as the modern 
interpreter of the mystical mode of the Quaker tradition.' 
In 1946, Geoffrey F. Nuttall published his scholarly study, 
T h e  Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience? In present- 
ing early Quakerism in its immediate historical context, Nuttall 
brought out the lack of any influence by Jacob Boehme and the 
Cambridge Platonists upon George Fox, despite the assertion 
by Rufus Jones that they had had a '  major influence. Nuttall 
demonstrated that early Quakerism was an outgrowth of radical 
Puritanism rather than of the mystical movements of the 
continent. He noted that the Spiritual Reformers of the six- 
teenth and seventeenth centuries preceded Puritanism and in 
some cases anticipated the radical Puritanism of the Quakers, 
but that their influence, if any, was indirect. 
In spite of these studies of Fox which were at variance 
with Rufus Jones's interpretation of Fox, no adequate critique 
has yet been attempted of Jones and his affirmation mysticism. 
The following is an attempt in this direction. 
I. JONES ON THE "MYSTICAL" AND "MYSTICISM" 
In the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (henceforth 
abbreviated ERE), Rufus Jones wrote the introductory article 
on "Mysticism" in 1917: In it he makes the following impor- 
tant distinction: 
The word 'mysticism' has, furthermore, been 
commonly used to cover both (1) the first-hand 
experience of direct intercourse with God and 
(2) the theologicsmetaphysical doctrine of the 
soul's possible union with Absolute Reality, i.e. 
with God. It would be conducive to clarity to 
restrict the word 'mysticism' to the latter signifi- 
cance, namely, as an equivalent for the German 
ward Mystik, and as designating the historic 
doctrine of the relationship and potential union 
of the human soul with Ultimate Reality, and to 
use the term 'mystical experience' for direct inter- 
course with God. 
First hand, or mystical, experience is primarily 
a psychological question; the doctrine of mysti- 
cism is essentially a metaphysical problem." 
5
Bassuk: Response to Comments
Published by Digital Commons @ George Fox University, 1978
